A Functional Imaging Study of Cooperation in Two-Person reciprocal Exchange by McCabe, Kevin et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
A Functional Imaging Study of
Cooperation in Two-Person reciprocal
Exchange
Kevin McCabe and Daniel Houser and Lee Ryan and Vernon
Smith and Ted Trouard
George Mason University
2001
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/5172/
MPRA Paper No. 5172, posted 6. October 2007
A functional imaging study of cooperation in
two-person reciprocal exchange
Kevin McCabe*†‡, Daniel Houser*†§, Lee Ryan*¶, Vernon Smith*†, and Theodore Trouard*i
*Cognition and Neuroimaging Laboratories, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85721; †Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science, George Mason
University, 4400 University Drive, MSN 1B2, Fairfax, VA 22030; §Department of Economics, McClelland Hall 401, P.O. Box 210108, University of
Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85721-0108; ¶Department of Psychology, Psychology 312, P.O. Box 210068, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85721-0068;
and iBiomedical Engineering Program, AHSC 5302, P.O. Box 245084, Tucson, AZ 85724
Contributed by Vernon Smith, August 7, 2001
Cooperation between individuals requires the ability to infer each
other’s mental states to form shared expectations over mutual
gains and make cooperative choices that realize these gains. From
evidence that the ability for mental state attribution involves the
use of prefrontal cortex, we hypothesize that this area is involved
in integrating theory-of-mind processing with cooperative actions.
We report data from a functional MRI experiment designed to test
this hypothesis. Subjects in a scanner played standard two-person
‘‘trust and reciprocity’’ games with both human and computer
counterparts for cash rewards. Behavioral data shows that seven
subjects consistently attempted cooperation with their human
counterpart. Within this group prefrontal regions are more active
when subjects are playing a human than when they are playing a
computer following a fixed (and known) probabilistic strategy.
Within the group of five noncooperators, there are no significant
differences in prefrontal activation between computer and human
conditions.
Reciprocal exchange (1, 2) is ubiquitous to the behavior ofmany species (3–5). To make an exchange, it is necessary to
overcome the desire for immediate gratification in favor of
greater but postponed gains from mutual cooperation. Increased
specialization by humans in productive activities, together with
the advantages this has produced, likely has been built on
improved adaptations for social exchange. The social brain
hypothesis (6) explains brain growth as largely an adaptation to
more sophisticated forms of social interaction. Such an adapta-
tion would support more sophisticated reciprocity strategies such
as ‘‘goodwill-accounting’’ (7) and image-scoring strategies (8, 9).
The trust game, shown in Fig. 1, illustrates one of the joint
decision tree tasks used in the experiment. In this task two
subjects are paired with each other as decision makers 1 (DM1)
and 2 (DM2). In behavioral experiments with similar decision
trees (10, 11) 50% of the DM1 subjects make the trusting move
right. In response 75% of the DM2 subjects reciprocate. In these
cases DM1 and DM2 reach the cooperative outcome [180, 225].
If, however, DM1 moves left the game ends at the nonrisky
outcome [45, 45]. By moving right DM1 takes the risk that DM2
will defect by moving right to the outcome [0, 405].
Based on imaging and lesion experiments (12–15) that study
activations associated with understanding another person’s mental
states (16, 17), we hypothesize that cooperative behavior requires
the binding of contingent information that allows subjects to
evaluate the mental states of their counterpart and commit to a
stimuli-conditioned reward-motivated choice. This commitment
allows subjects to delay their desire for immediate gratification (18)
and achieve a higher cooperative reward. We hypothesize that the
medial prefrontal cortex serves as an important convergence zone
in this decision problem, because it exhibits a pattern of connectivity
(19, 20) that would enable the binding of game and counterpart
entities to a mutual-gains event.
Materials and Methods
Subjects were recruited to participate in a paid functional MRI
experiment lasting ’1.5 h.
Behavioral Protocol. Subjects responded to cash-payoff salient
features of a visually presented two-person binary game tree by
pressing response buttons with their right (move right) or left
hand (move left). The subjects played the role of either first
decision maker or second decision maker in each game. Second
decision makers saw the first decision makers’ choice before
making their decision. Subjects were matched with either a
human or computer counterpart and were visually informed of
their counterpart’s type before seeing the game tree. When the
subject in the scanner played the computer they were told that
it would play a fixed probabilistic strategy of 75% left and 25%
right as DM2 and that the computer plays 100% right as DM1.
We provided this information to the subjects to reduce the
chances that the subjects would try to predict the experimenters’
intentions. Similarly, when the computer moved, it did so
immediately to make it less likely that subjects would anthro-
pomorphize the computer responses. The task was administered
in six scanning runs. Each run consisted of 12 randomly pre-
sented games with different payoffs with counterbalanced roles
and counterparts. Behavioral and functional MRI data were
recorded simultaneously from 12 right-handed subjects who
were trained before entering the scanner. The subjects provided
written informed consent.
Experimental Design. Subjects, in pairs, played three types of games:
a trust game, a punish game, and a mutual advantage game. In each
experiment one subject played the game through an interactive
goggleybutton system in the scanner while the other subject made
decisions from a computer in the control room that was connected
Abbreviations: TR, repetition time; DM1 and DM2, decision makers 1 and 2, respectively.
‡To whom reprint requests should be addressed. E-mail: kmccabe@gmu.edu.
The publication costs of this article were defrayed in part by page charge payment. This
article must therefore be hereby marked “advertisement” in accordance with 18 U.S.C.
§1734 solely to indicate this fact.
Fig. 1. Diagram of trust game used in the decision making. In the trust game,
DM1 moves first (at node x1) by either moving left, and ending the game, or
moving right, giving DM2 a move. If DM1 moves right, DM2 gets the opportunity
to move (at node x2). Once DM2 moves, the game ends, DM1 is paid the top
number as a payoff, and DM2 is paid the bottom number as a payoff. By moving
right DM1 is trusting DM2 to reciprocate and not defect (move right). By substi-
tuting different payoff numbers, different incentives for cooperation can be
studied.
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to the scanner system. The subject in the scanner played 72 games,
in six blocks of 12, presented in a random order. In 36 of these games
it was common knowledge that the subjects played each other
(Human–Human), whereas in the other 36 games the subject who
was in the scanner played a computer following a fixed (and known)
probabilistic strategy (Human–Computer). All earnings were paid
in cash at the end of each session.
The timeline for stimulus and response for a single play of a
game is shown in Fig. 2. Each game begins with a splash screen,
which is a 6-s introductory screen that informs subjects of which
role they will be playing (DM1 or DM2) and whether their
counterpart is a human or computer. If they are playing against
the computer they are also told the probability that the computer
will play left and the probability that the computer will play right.
The remaining sequence of events depends on the subject’s role.
If the subject is playing as DM1 the subject sees the game tree
with the appropriate payoffs and makes a decision to go either
left or right; the subject then waits for DM2 to make a decision,
sees the resulting play of the game, and indicates that he or she
is ready to continue. If the subject is playing as DM2 the subject
sees a blank screen until DM1 has made a decision; the subject
then sees the game tree with DM1’s decision and makes a
decision, sees the resulting play of the game, and indicates that
he or she is ready to continue. After looking at results the subject
then watched a screen with rolling bars for 15 s .
Data Acquisition. Functional images were acquired on an 1.5-T
whole body MRI scanner (Signa Echospeed, General Electric
Medical Systems, Milwaukee, WI) equipped with a standard
quadrature head coil. A single-shot gradient echo spiral acqui-
sition was used (21) with repetition time (TR) 5 2,000 ms, echo
time 5 40 ms, field of view 5 220 3 220 mm2, and matrix 5 64 3
64. Fifteen contiguous 6-mm slices, oriented parallel to the
AC-PC line, were imaged each TR. Six functional scans lasting
an average of 7 min were taken as subjects played 12 decision
problems presented in random order. High-resolution T1-
weighted images were obtained over the same volume for
registration of the functional results. After the functional exam-
ination, high resolution three-dimensional gradient echo images
were obtained in the sagittal plane for registration of the
functional data sets with the following parameters: 1.5-mm slice,
TR 5 22 ms, echo time 5 5 ms, field of view 5 250 3 250 mm2,
matrix 5 256 3 256, and flip angle 5 30°.
Analysis. The functional MRI data were analyzed with SPM99
(www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.ukyspm). Each subject’s images were re-
aligned, normalized to the Montreal Neurological Institute
template, spatially smoothed (Gaussian kernel, full width at half
maximum 5 12 mm), and temporally smoothed using standard
SPM99 procedures. For each subject, the areas of activation were
assessed by creating statistical parametric maps based on voxel-
wise linear multiple regression with conditions (convolved with
SPM99’s ideal hemodynamic response function) and orthogonal
temporal basis functions (SPM99’s default high pass filter to
account for nuisance effects including temporal drift and phys-
iological artifacts on the signal) as regressors. Data from games
3, 6, 9, and 12 are not expected to invoke theory-of-mind
reasoning and were not included in the analysis. Also, because
there are only four human and four computer decisions within
each session, each subject’s data were pooled across all of their
sessions. Hence, we restricted session effects to those captured
by the default high pass filter. For each individual, a cluster was
considered to be significantly more active in the human than
computer condition if it contained at least 12 contiguous voxels
that evidenced greater activity in that condition (P , 0.001
uncorrected, according to SPM’s standard statistical proce-
dures). An activation was considered to be in the medial
prefrontal cortex if any part the cluster fell within that region. To
determine the location of activations we relied on the atlas of
Tailarach and Tournoux and a visual inspection of the Montreal
Neurological Institute normalized structural scans.
A conjunction analysis as implemented in SPM99 was used to
determine areas of activation common to all cooperators. A second
conjunction analysis was used to determine the areas of activation
common to all noncooperators. Our study includes seven cooper-
ators and five noncooperators. The null hypothesis of interest is that
at any given voxel, there is not differential activation between the
human and computer conditions for every relevant subject. Hence,
a voxel is considered ‘‘active’’ across subjects if and only if, for each
subject, the t statistic at that voxel exceeds a given threshold. To
obtain an overall P , 0.001 (uncorrected), we used T thresholds of
0.32 (P 5 0.37 uncorrected) for our seven cooperators and 0.67 (P 5
0.25 uncorrected) for our five noncooperators. To determine the
location of common activations we again relied on the atlas of
Tailarach and Tournoux and a visual inspection of the Montreal
Neurological Institute normalized structural scans.
Results
This study examines the bold response one TR (1.5 s) before the
results screen, because decision making for cooperation is likely
to be salient at this TR independent of the subject’s position in
the game. If the subject is DM1 or DM2 with a move, which
occurs in 92% of the games, then this is the final TR of their
decision period, whereas if they are DM2 without a move this is
the final TR of the ‘‘wait’’ period. DM2s are likely to ask
themselves during the wait condition, ‘‘What is my counterpart
doing?’’ and begin to form beliefs about what a delay means
about their counterpart’s desires. We expect the human and
computer treatments to generate differential activations associ-
ated with predicting and understanding the cooperative inten-
tions of another human. Our analysis treats the rolling-bars
condition as the baseline.
We compute the number of cooperative moves in the trust and
punish games. The maximum possible score is 18. At the
individual level we looked for significant activation differences
when playing a human vs. the computer. Fig. 3 shows the pattern
of activation for a cooperator (subject 19). The six subjects (24,
9, 25, 19, 6, and 2) with the highest cooperation scores show
significant increases in activation in medial prefrontal regions
during human–human interactions when compared with
human–computer interactions. However, the location of these
activations vary by subject. The six subjects who received the
Fig. 2. Timeline of decisions and information for one game played by DM2
inside the scanner.
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lowest cooperation scores (22, 10, 18, 21, 11, and 3) did not show
significant activation differences in medial prefrontal cortex
between the human and computer conditions.
An aggregate analysis suggests a common cortical network for
cooperation. Consistent with previous behavioral studies (22,
23) subjects who made cooperative moves at least one third of
the time, i.e., scores of six or higher, were precategorized as
cooperative. This categorization results in seven cooperative
subjects (24, 9, 25, 19, 6, 2, and 22), and five noncooperative
subjects (10, 18, 21, 11, and 3). Fig. 4 shows the results of a
conjunction analysis for human vs. computer differences for the
seven cooperators (P 5 0.001 uncorrected). A conjunction
analysis (P 5 0.001 uncorrected) with noncooperators shows no
significant activation differences between the human and com-
puter conditions.
Discussion
Fig. 4 suggests that cooperators have a common pattern of
‘‘bold’’ activation differences. This suggests that cooperation
requires an active convergence zone (24), possibly in prefrontal
cortex, that binds joint attention to mutual gains with the
inhibition of immediate reward gratification to allow cooperative
decisions. Systematic activation differences are observed in (i)
the occipital lobe (Brodmann area 17, 18), in which we hypoth-
esize greater visual demands are placed on subjects who are
trying to understand both their own payoffyincentives and the
payoffyincentives of their counterparts. Common activation
differences are also observed in (ii) the parietal lobe (Brodmann
area 7), which is part of the ‘‘where’’ pathway for primate vision
(25) and (iii) the thalamus. Consistent with our hypothesis that
cooperation requires prefrontal control (26) activation, differ-
ences are observed in (iv) the middle frontal gyrus and (v) the
frontal pole (Brodmann area 10).
In conclusion, our behavioral data shows that half the subjects
in our experiment consistently attempted cooperation with their
human counterpart. Within this group, and within subjects
comparison, we find that regions of prefrontal cortex are more
active when subjects are playing a human than when they are
playing a computer following a fixed (and known) probabilistic
strategy. Within the group of noncooperators we find no signif-
icant differences in prefrontal cortex between the computer and
human conditions. One possible explanation for our results is
that within this class of games, subjects learn to adopt game
form-dependent rules of thumb when playing the computer or
when playing noncooperatively with a human counterpart. In
comparison, cooperation requires an active convergence zone
that binds joint attention to mutual gains with sufficient inhibi-
tion of immediate reward gratification to allow cooperative
decisions.
We acknowledge Georgio Coricelli and Mary Rigdon for their help in
collecting the data and the help of Ming Hsu and Adam Talenfeld in
assisting with the analysis of the data.
Fig. 3. Bold response of a cooperator for the contrast human (H) . computer
(C). The blobs on the glass brain are clusters of at least 12 contiguous voxels
that show significantly more activation in the human than computer condi-
tion (SPM t map, P , 0.001 uncorrected). The cursor on the glass brain is
located at the voxel with the greatest t statistic within the medial prefrontal
clusters. The graph immediately below the glass brains displays the peri-
stimulus time histogram at the voxel indicated by the cursor. This is the mean
of the adjusted (for time and physiological effects) response to the computer
and human conditions over all the trials. The bar extends one standard error
above and below the mean.
Fig. 4. Aggregate conjunction analysis of the contrast human . homputer
for the seven cooperators showing a cooperation score of 6 or better. (P 5
0.001 uncorrected.)
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